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Abstract
This paper explores the emergence of a world economy since 1950 and its
implications for the world's labor force. There are five main sets of
conclusions. First, the share of the world's labor force located in
developing countries increased significantly between 1950 and 1990.
Productivity differentials between high- and low-income countries did not
decrease over time, and wage differentials were even larger than productivity
differentials. These results suggest that whatever integration took place
between the industrial and developing countries was insufficient to overcome
the large differentials in labor force growth rates between them.
Second, although the integration of national economies since 1950 has
been considerable, the world economy is still in its adolescence. Rapid
integration has occurred among the industrial economies, but integration among
the developing economies and between the industrial and the developing
economies has proceeded slowly.
Third, international labor mobility can account for little, if any,
economic integration since 1950. The economic integration that has been
achieved is due mainly to the increased flow of capital across international
boundaries and, more important, to the dramatic increase in trade, especially
among the industrial countries. These developments have been driven by
technological changes that have reduced the costs of transportation and
communication, and by institutional changes that have reduced the barriers to
trade and capital mobility while maintaining or increasing barriers to
international labor mobility.
Fourth, these patterns of integration are associated with a sharp decline
in income inequality among the industrial economies, but with some rise in
world income inequality as the income gap between the industrial and
developing countries has increased.
Finally, the large increase in developing economies' share of the world
labor force projected for the next few decades will magnify their incentives
to integrate more closely among themselves and with the industrial economies.
World income per capita will be promoted by such integration, which is likely
to occur through increased international trade and international relocation of
jobs, not through a substantial rise in international labor mobility.
Labor and the Emerging World Economy
The greatest improvement in the productive powers of
labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and
judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem
to have been the effects of the division of labour....
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to
the division of labour, so the extent of this division must
always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other
words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very
small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate
himself entirely to one employment, for want of the power to
exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own
labour...for such parts of the produce of other men's labour
as he has occasion for....
As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is
opened to every sort of industry than what land-carriage alone
can afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along the
banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind
naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself.
Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, chapters I and III.
For centuries countries have had economic ties of various kinds with
each other. However, in recent decades economic integration among countries
has increased dramatically. The share of international trade in the world's
gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 9 percent in 1950 to 15 percent in
1989, while international borrowing increased nearly tenfold in real terms
between the 1970s and 1990. Two main factors have driven these and other
related developments: technological changes that have reduced the costs of
transportation and communication, and institutional changes that have reduced
the barriers to trade and capital mobility.
Technological advances have effectively reduced the distances between
countries and continents. Trips that used to take weeks by boat now take a
few hours by plane. Larger and faster ships have reduced international
freight costs. The ratio of insurance and transportation costs to the value
of internationally-traded goods decreased by 36 percent between 1950 and 1990.
Communication systems have also become more efficient, facilitating more
frequent interactions between individuals and organizations around the world.
Bank managers in New York can check the status of an account in their Hong
Kong branch without leaving their desks, and managers of Japanese automotive
companies can check the level of inventories in their Tennessee plant without
leaving Tokyo. Similarly, corporate executives can sign contracts by faxing
their signatures rather than flying to the same location. These improvements
in communication technology, which have substantially lowered the cost of
monitoring operations and carrying out transactions across countries, helped
to increase the share of direct foreign investment in world capital formation
by 50 percent between 1965 and 1985.
Institutional changes that have facilitated the expansion of
international transactions include the constant decrease, since the 1930s, of
tariffs through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system and
various regional trade agreements. In the developed economies, import tariff
revenues are currently less than 5 percent of the value of imports. In the
1930s, for example, this figure was 18 percent for the United States.
Regional treaties like the European Economic Community (EEC), the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA), and the United States-Canada free trade area
have also reduced non-tariff barriers to trade and eliminated many constraints
on economic cooperation between individuals and firms in different countries.
Efforts to enhance international economic cooperation continue, focusing
on expanding the GATT; completing the economic unification of Europe;
implementing the recent North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); and, most
dramatically, integrating Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the
world economy. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and
several regional development banks have also increased in prominence and are
helping to promote international capital flows and the coordination of
countries' macroeconomic policies.
World economic integration has proceeded even though international labor
mobility has not increased in recent decades. In the developed economies,
immigration-population ratios decreased or remained constant between the 1950s
and the mid- 1980s. Developed country governments generally do not encourage
international migration and often inhibit it through the imposition of various
legal or financial barriers. Sizable labor movements have occurred in some
developing regions, especially the Gulf countries, that are significant
regionally, but less significant for the world economy. Limitations on the
physical mobility of labor, however, have not prevented the emergence of a
global market for labor services as services can be exchanged in a variety of
ways that do not require the physical proximity of buyers and sellers.
Consider, for example, a British entrepreneur who hires an Italian
company to design a new line of clothing, then has those designs sent for
production to a clothing factory in southern China, and has a shipping company
in Hong Kong send the finished product for sale in the United States. Without
the entrepreneur or any worker having to cross a national border, this example
involves the labor services of workers in five countries being exchanged.
Alternatively, consider a United States shoe manufacturer trying to take
advantage of low-wage labor in Mexico by hiring workers in northern Mexico to
operate machinery that is shipped across the border from the United States to
produce shoes that are then shipped back to the United States for sale. In
this example, labor services have also been exchanged internationally,
although the mobility of capital facilitated the exchange in this case.
Finally, consider the latter example, but with a Mexican producer who
uses equipment produced in Mexico. Mexico is still selling labor services,
though in this case only by trading goods. As in the previous two examples,
an international exchange of labor services is taking place despite the lack
of labor mobility across national borders. The emergence of an integrated
world economy gives rise to many similar examples.
The objective of this study is to explore the implications of the
emerging world economy since 1950 for the world's labor force. Section I will
present a statistical portrait of the world labor force since 1950 and its
distribution by geographic region, gender, age, and quality. Section II
presents a conceptual analysis of the gains associated with the emergence of
an integrated world economy and its implications for the world's labor force.
Section III will provide evidence on factors that are directly related to the
actual integration of the world economy, including trade and immigration
barriers, freight costs, and international trade agreements. Section IV will
examine the extent to which world markets have become more integrated because
of labor, capital, or trade flows. Section V summarizes the main findings and
speculates on their effects on future economic integration, national economic
stability, the evolution of national and international economic institutions,
and income inequality within and between nations.
I. The World Supply of Labor
This section distinguishes between potential labor force, defined as the
working-age population, and the actual labor force, defined as the number of
individuals engaged in market economic activity or seeking employment. In so
doing, it will ignore such issues as the number of hours people work;
measurement errors related to whether individuals are, or would like to be, in
the labor force; and characteristics such as ability and motivation. Although
such issues are important determinants of the productive capacity of the world
labor force, they are beyond the scope of this study.
The productive capacity of the world economy also depends on the human
capital embodied in the world's labor force. Increased numbers of educated
and trained people increase the potential stock of labor services, and hence
the world's productive capacity. We will provide some evidence on the growing
stock of human capital by reporting statistics on the growth of educational
attainment from the 1960s to the 1980s. Due to data limitations, we will
overlook other forms of human capital, such as work experience and specialized
training.
In addition, we will examine the distribution of the world's labor
supply across country groups. As historical experience shows that capital
accumulation promotes labor productivity, we will also examine whether the
supply of labor is growing relatively faster where physical capital is most
abundant.
Table 1 reports statistics on the world's population and its potential
and actual labor force in 1950 and 1980, with estimates for 1990 and
projections for the years 2000 and 2025. In 1990, the actual world labor
force consisted of 2.3 billion people, more than twice the number in 1950.
These members of the actual labor force represented about two-thirds of the
potential labor force, and were supporting roughly three billion other people
who were not part of the world labor force.
The statistics in table 1 show that industrial countries' share of the
world labor supply decreased over time. [1] While their share was about
one-third of the world labor supply in 1950, it had decreased to about
one-quarter by 1990, and the projected share for the year 2025 is about
one-sixth. The projections suggest that only 3.3 percent of the increase in
the world labor force between 1990 and 2025 will occur in the developed
economies (which is only half of their share in projected population growth
because of relatively more aging in the developed countries). The table also
predicts that the annual growth rate of the world labor force will decrease
from 1.8 percent between 1950 and 1990 to 1.3 percent between 1990 and 2025.
Table 2 sets out the mean age of the world labor force and what
proportion of it is female. These statistics are also reported separately for
the developed and the developing economies. [2] The table shows an increase
in the share of women in the labor force of the developed countries and no
change for the developing economies. The data also show that the mean age of
the world labor force was stable between 1950 and 1990, reflecting a small
increase in the mean age of the labor force in the developed economies and a
slight decrease in the developing countries. The projections into the
twenty-first century suggest an increase in the mean age of the world labor
force.
Table 3 reports labor force participation rates (LFPR) broken down by
country group, age, and gender. For most of the categories shown,
participation rates increased in the industrial economies and decreased in the
developing economies. The participation rates for younger people have
decreased significantly for all countries because of increased educational
attainment. In the developed economies the increased participation of women
offset this decrease. However, this did not occur in the developing economies
(at least according to the available data), and thus the overall LFPR
decreased. [3]
A comparison of LFPR by gender shows that the rate for men is higher
than the rate for women, but that these rates are tending to converge in the
developed countries. The LFPR for women is higher in the industrial than in
the developing countries, although as noted earlier, data on female LFPR in
developing countries should be interpreted with caution.
In contrast to tables 1 to 3, which presented the labor supply in terms
of numbers of workers and their demographic characteristics, tables 4 and 5
provide information on a key dimension of labor quality: education.
According to table 4, the average number of years of schooling for people aged
twenty-five to twenty-nine was 7.1 years in 1980, about two years more than
for those aged forty-five to forty-nine. This difference is a key indicator
that the human capital embodied in the world labor force has increased sharply
over time. Table 4 also shows that increased schooling occurred in both
developing and industrial countries, although the proportional increase in
schooling was much larger in the developing countries. The ratio of average
years of schooling in the industrial countries to average years of schooling
in the developing countries was three for the older age group and only two for
the younger age group. [4]
Table 5 reports enrollment-population ratios, broken down by education
level and income group. The statistics show a sharp increase in educational
attainment at all levels between 1965 and 1989 for both the developed and
developing countries and for the world as a whole. [5] The proportional
increase was faster at the higher education levels, reflecting, at least
partially, the fact that in many countries enrollment-population ratios
reached the natural ceiling of universal attendance in primary—and sometimes
secondary—education.
Enrollment-population ratios in the industrial countries are higher than
in the developing countries, and the differences in the ratios are larger at
the higher education levels, partially reflecting the same ceiling effect
noted earlier. The increase in educational attainment was, however, faster in
the developing countries, with larger differences in growth rates at higher
education levels.
The estimates in tables 4 and 5 draw additional strength from their
consistency, which is notable given that the data come from different sources.
For example, a comparison of the actual years of schooling for the twenty-five
to twenty-nine age group, as reported by Horn and Arriagada (1986) (see table
4) with an estimate based on the World Bank data presented in table 5, yields
relatively similar results.
To sum up, this section has shown that the share of the world's labor
force located in developing countries increased significantly between 1950 and
1990 and is predicted to continue to grow. This change in geographical
distribution of the world labor force puts most of the increments in the world
labor force at locations where both human and physical capital are relatively
scarce. Tables 4 and 5 show that developing countries are addressing the need
to increase the supply of human capital by increasing people's access to
education, and doing so at a faster pace than in the industrial countries.
II. Gains Associated with the Emergence of a Global Labor Market
One of the main features of the world supply of labor is that it has
grown at different rates in the industrial countries than in the developing
countries. This differential is a result of differential rates of population
growth and of behavioral changes that affect labor force participation rates.
The behavioral changes mainly involve school enrollment decisions, retirement
behavior, and female labor force participation.
Taking these labor supply changes as our jumping off point, this section
examines the incentives they create for national economies to integrate more
closely. We do this by reviewing basic economic principles regarding the
gains that can be realized by removing the barriers that separate economies.
The footnotes provide some references to more advanced models.
Example I: Gains from International Factor Mobility
Consider a world that consists of two islands: A and B. Suppose both
islands are endowed with three types of production factors: land, which is
freely available in unlimited supply on both islands, and workers and mules,







Assume that one worker using one mule can cultivate one acre per year, and
that workers without mules cannot cultivate any land at all.
In this highly-stylized example, islands A and B will each enjoy the
fruits of 100 acres per year, since this is the maximal number of worker-mule
pairs on both islands. Clearly, however, resources are being underutilized on
both islands. On island A 900 workers have no mules with which to work, and
island B has 900 mules with no workers to guide them. If the economies of
islands A and B could integrate, total output could increase more than
fivefold. As land is abundant, this could be done by either shipping 900
mules from island B to A, or shipping 900 workers from island A to B, or by
some intermediate combination.
This example demonstrates the general principle that there are potential
gains from factor mobility (which we assume to be costless in this example)
when the presence of one production factor enhances the productivity of
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others. In this example, the contribution of one more worker to production
(also known as the marginal product of labor) is zero on island A and one on
island B. The marginal product of a mule on island A is one and on island B
is zero. It is efficient to move labor to the location where its productivity
is higher, island B, or to move mules in the opposite direction. Locational
(or sectoral) differences in the marginal product of specific factors, such as
labor, are an indication of potential gains to factor mobility.
Thus, gains in output can be achieved by integrating separate economies.
Achieving these gains does not require the movement of labor across borders,
because the mobility of other production factors can achieve the same gains.
As long as no other production factors are location-specific and
transportation costs for the different factors are effectively the same, labor
and capital mobility are good substitutes for achieving efficient production.
Example II: Gains from International Trade
Another way in which economies can increase their production and
consumption through integration is by trading goods and services with other
economies. Consider, for example, two economies that each use labor to
produce shoes and to knit sweaters. Suppose that both countries have the same
size labor force, but that workers in country A are more efficient at
producing shoes, while workers in country B are more efficient at knitting
sweaters. [6] In this case, as Ricardo (reprinted in Sraffa, 1951, vol. I, p.
135) first suggested, both countries would benefit from trade, with A
concentrating on producing shoes and B on sweaters.
To demonstrate this point one can use a standard tool in economics: the
production possibilities frontier (PPF). This frontier represents the maximal
combinations of different outputs that an economy can produce through the
efficient use of its entire stock of inputs. The frontier must slope down, as
the economy cannot increase the production of one good without decreasing the
production of another good. In the absence of trade, consumption in each
country can lie on, but not outside, its PPF.
Assume in this example (a) that the world consists of two countries, A
and B, and that each country has ten workers, (b) that each worker in country
A can either produce ten pairs of shoes or knit four sweaters per day, and (c)
that each worker in country B can either produce four pairs of shoes or knit
ten sweaters per day. These assumptions of differential productivity imply
the following PPFs for the two countries:















In the absence of trade, the cost of knitting a sweater, in terms of the
resources that could have been used for other purposes (that is, the
opportunity cost), is 2.5 shoes in country A and 0.4 shoes in country B.
Similarly, the opportunity cost of crafting a pair of shoes is 0.4 sweaters in
country A and 2.5 sweaters in country B.
Assume now that consumers' tastes in the two countries are such that
consumers in country A choose to consume seventy-five shoes and ten sweaters,
while consumers in country B choose to consume ten shoes and seventy-five
sweaters. World consumption is therefore eighty-five sweaters and eighty-five
pairs of shoes. Note that in neither country can consumers increase the
consumption of one good without giving up consumption of the other.
If the countries start to trade with each other, however, the world
economy benefits as consumers in both countries can increase their consumption
and improve their welfare. The difference in production costs between the two
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countries will result in imports of shoes to country B (as country A produces
them more cheaply) and imports of sweaters to country A (as country B produces









Production is allocated in the world market so that country A produces
shoes as long as world demand does not exceed country A's production capacity.
If world demand exceeds country A's capacity to produce shoes, some shoes will
be produced at the less efficient location: country B. One can see now that
the initial consumption (and production) level of the world economy was inside
the world PPF, and that consumption of both goods can be increased by allowing
the two countries to trade.
This example demonstrates the classic economic result of gains from
trade. It also demonstrates that trade and labor mobility are substitutes in
achieving efficient production from a global point of view. In this example,
if all workers moved to the same location, consumption along the world PPF is
also possible. [7]
When many production factors exist, and when their proportions are very
different in different countries, trade may not be a perfect substitute for
factor mobility. However, even in such a case trade allows the world economy
to move closer to its PPF, and in that sense is at least a partial substitute
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for labor mobility. [8]
Summary
In 1936 the father of supply-demand analysis, Alfred Marshall, wrote:
"The direct demand for a finished product is in effect split up into many
derived demands for the things used in producing it" (p. 381). This section
has elaborated on this observation to make the crucial point that the demand
for labor services need not be a direct demand for labor. It may instead be
expressed through the demand for the goods that embody labor services. For
example, when one buys a hand-made Turkish carpet, one is buying the services
of the workers who wove the carpet and not just the materials.
Thus, labor markets in different countries can be integrated by
movements of labor, capital, or goods. Within certain limits, international
movements of these three factors are close substitutes for each other in the
integration of the world economy and the effective emergence of a global labor
market. As long as countries differ in the productivities of their labor or
other resources, and incomes, there will be forces impelling further
international economic integration. [9] The particular form that the
integration takes will depend on a variety of economic factors such as the
relative costs of mobility, but may also depend on political, cultural, and
social factors.
III. Allocation and Performance of World Labor Resources
One of the key factors driving the integration of the world economy is
the existence of differential benefits across national economies and economic
sectors from additional units of labor and capital (that is, cross-national
differences in the marginal productivity of different factors of production).
In the presence of such differentials, moving labor from low productivity
countries to high productivity countries can improve efficiency. Shifting
labor within each country or group of countries from low to high productivity
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sectors can result in similar gains. This section discusses measures of these
productivity differences in order to assess the potential for further gains
from economic integration of the world economy. [10] It also examines changes
in those differentials over time to establish the extent to which efficiency
gains have been realized in past decades.
Table 6 reports the distribution of the world labor force across the
agricultural, industrial, and service sectors during the years 1950 to 1980.
The data show that the agricultural sector's share decreased steadily over
time, while the shares of the industrial sector and (especially) the service
sector increased. This pattern holds in both the developed and the developing
countries. [11] In 1980 the service sector dominated employment in the
industrial countries while the agricultural sector dominated employment in the
developing economies. The decline in the share of the agricultural sector in
the developed countries was proportionately much greater than in the
developing countries.
Table 7 reports real labor productivity (output per worker) for the same
sectors and countries as table 6 between 1960 and 1980. [12] Productivity
increased in every sector from 1960 to 1980, with larger increases for the
world as a whole in the industrial and service sectors, which were the high
productivity sectors in 1960. In the industrial economies, labor productivity
in the agricultural sector grew faster than in the other sectors, but slow
productivity growth in the agriculture sector of the developing countries left
agriculture behind the two other sectors in world productivity. Productivity
in the industrial sector grew faster than in the service sector, both in the
developed and the developing countries.
Taken together, tables 6 and 7 show that employment shifted out of
low-productivity agriculture to the higher-productivity service and industry
sectors. These shifts tended to decrease productivity differentials across
sectors in the developed countries from 1960 to 1980. The ratio of
productivity in industry to productivity in agriculture in those countries
decreased from about three in 1960 to about two in 1980. By contrast, the
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smaller proportionate shifts that took place in the developing countries did
not erode the productivity gaps between sectors, which actually increased
between 1960 and 1980. These results show the great potential that still
exists for increased efficiency within the developing countries and from
integration of the industrial economies with the developed ones.
Table 7 also shows that overall productivity differentials between the
developed and developing countries decreased only slightly between 1960 and
1980. These decreases partly reflect the temporary effect of high energy
prices in 1980 [13], and are therefore evidence that little, if any,
productivity convergence between developed and developing countries took place
during that period. [14]
Table 8 documents the developing countries' increasing share in world
employment, broken down by sector, between 1960 and 1980. In 1980 workers in
developing countries comprised 97 percent of the world labor force in
agriculture, where their productivity relative to workers in the developed
economies is the lowest. During 1950 to 1980 the share of developing country
workers in industry increased from 41 to 63 percent, and in services from 54
to 58 percent. Table 8 also shows that while workers in the developing
countries made up 71 percent of the world labor force in 1980, they produced
only 2 5 percent of the world's output.
Table 9 compares productivity and unit labor costs in the industrial
countries with those in the developing countries. [15] The data are broken
down by manufacturing branch, which is the finest level of disaggregation
available. The unit labor cost data are important because from the standpoint
of employers a less productive labor force is undesirable only if wages are
not comparably low.
The data in table 9 reveal three notable results. First, productivity
is higher in the developed countries in all manufacturing branches. Second,
relative productivity in the developed countries increased in all but two
industries between 1963 and 1980. Third, in 1980 wage differentials exceeded
the corresponding productivity differentials, resulting in higher unit labor
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costs in the developed economies. The north/south ratio of unit labor cost
vary in a surprisingly narrow band from 1.3 to 1.6 for most industries. For
the manufacturing sector as a whole, however, this ratio is higher because, as
Brender (1988) notes, industrial economies tend to concentrate their
production in industries where unit labor costs are higher.
The developing countries' share in world production of most
manufacturing industries increased between 1980 and 1987. This rise may
indicate that the world allocation of labor does respond to differences in
relative costs of production. However, it may also reflect differential
changes in local demand as a result of population growth when domestic markets
are protected. One indication that the increasing share of the south in the
world's manufacturing production is not a response to cost differentials is
that there is virtually no correlation between the size of the cost
differential and the increase in the developing countries' production share.
The rising productivity ratios in table 9 indicate that whatever
integration the economies of the north and south achieved during the 1960s and
1970s, it was insufficient to overcome the big differences in labor force
growth rates between the two groups of countries. Specificially, the
increasing productivity gap indicates that the combination of capital flows
from north to south and labor flows from south to north were not sufficient to
overcome the relatively large labor supply increments in the south.
Expansions of international trade, with the south countries specializing in
labor-intensive products, could have also contributed to a narrowing
productivity gap, but in practice the gap widened.
IV. The Contribution of Labor and Capital Mobility and
International Trade to World Economic Integration
Section II argued that national economies can be effectively integrated
into a world economy through (a) labor mobility, (b) capital mobility, or (c)
international trade of goods and services. Section III established that
productivity differentials between high- and low-income countries did not
decrease over time, and that wage differentials were even larger than
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productivity differentials. These results suggest that whatever integration
took place between the industrial and developing countries was not enough to
overcome the large differentials in labor force growth rates that prevailed
between those country groups. This section explores this result by focusing
directly on some major mechanisms that underlie international economic
integration, namely, labor mobility, capital mobility, and trade between
developed and developing countries. It also examines economic integration
within each country group.
Labor Mobility
Estimates suggest that in the late 1980s about 80 million people lived
outside their nations of citizenship (Widgren 1987). This number constitutes
only 1.5 percent of the world's population and indicates that population
mobility across borders is a relatively limited phenomenon. Of the migrants,
about 44 percent were located in Sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting labor
movements between the poorest nations, and about 8 percent were Afghani war
refugees in Pakistan and Iran. These data imply that migrants from the
developing countries to the industrial ones constitute only a modest
proportion of the world stock of migrants.
Data on international migration flows support the observation that labor
mobility is fairly limited relative to the size of the world economy. Table
10 presents data on immigration-population ratios for selected developed
countries. The figures show that the ratio varies substantially across
countries, but only slightly over time. Between 1950 and 1984 immigration to
Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, and Switzerland
accounted for more than ten percent of their average population. By contrast,
in Japan and the United States, immigration flows constituted a much smaller
proportion of the population. For all the countries in table 10 taken as a
whole, migration flows as a share of population were quite stable across
decades. The ratio increased somewhat during the 1960s, but then declined
again until 1984. [16] Bearing in mind that many migrants do not stay at
their destination for more than a few years, and that the countries reported
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in table 10 absorb relatively large numbers of immigrants compared to other
countries (except Sub-Saharan Africa and the Gulf), these numbers are
relatively small compared to the 10 percent population growth per decade in
the developed countries during 1950-84. If national economies have become
more integrated since the 1950s, then the stability of immigration-population
ratios shows that labor mobility was not the factor responsible for such
integration.
Tables 11 and 12 summarize data from a 1987 United Nations survey (UN
1988) of 170 of its member countries. The figures suggest that most countries
do not view migration as particularly desirable and that governments design
policies accordingly.
Table 11 reports government perceptions of emigration and immigration
for the countries surveyed. Of the 170 countries, 105 reported that
emigration was insignificant. Only 2 of those 105 countries viewed this level
of migration as too low. Sixty-five countries viewed current emigration
levels as significant, and more than half of them perceived that level as too
high.
As concerns immigration, 112 countries viewed it as insignificant, of
which 107 found the situation satisfactory. Among the industrial countries,
all twenty-three that perceived immigration as insignificant are satisfied
with that situation. Fifty-eight countries perceived immigration levels as
significant, of which thirty-four perceived that level as too high and only
two as too low. Of the sixteen industrial economies that viewed immigration
as significant, none thought that level was too low and nine thought that the
level was too high.
Table 12 goes beyond perceptions and reports on actual policies the
surveyed countries adopted toward migration. The data show that only eight
countries had policies to encourage emigration while thirty-seven countries
had policies designed to reduce emigration. Another 101 governments did not
find a need to adopt policies on emigration or expressed the view that more
emigration is not desirable. Thirty-two countries had adopted policies aimed
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at reducing future immigration, while only five had implemented policies
encouraging higher rates of immigration. Among the industrial countries
surveyed, thirteen had adopted policies to cut future immigration rates while
none had adopted policies to promote more immigration.
The figures in tables 10 to 12 indicate that labor mobility has not been
an important factor in the integration of the world economy during the last
forty years. Labor mobility did not increase during that period and the
statistical indications do not suggest that governments will encourage more
migration in the future by relaxing legal constraints. Thus, (a) labor
mobility across national boundaries is not large; (b) it has not increased
over time; and (c) whatever integration of national economies occurs in the
foreseeable future, it is unlikely to be the result of increased labor
mobility.
Capital Mobility
International capital mobility is difficult to measure because it can
take many forms, including loans to foreign governments by private banks,
intergovernment loans, transactions in financial instruments, loans to private
enterprises in foreign countries, and direct foreign investment. Not all
international financial transactions represent direct shifts of productive
capacity between countries, and therefore may not relate directly to the
integration of national economies. Our discussion here begins by examining
direct foreign investment, which is clearly one form of capital mobility that
is directly tied to production. We will also provide some indications of the
increase in other forms of international capital mobility, although we do not
claim to offer any comprehensive measure of capital mobility in this paper.
Direct foreign investment is defined as the net amount nonresidents
invest or reinvest in enterprises in which they or other nonresidents exercise
significant managerial control. Direct foreign investment increased
significantly from 1965 to 1985. Table 13 shows that during that period the
share of direct foreign investment in the world's capital formation increased
by 50 percent. The absolute share of direct foreign investment in capital
18
formation remained quite small, however. As expected, almost all direct
foreign investment originated in the industrial countries.
Table 14 shows that from 1965 to 1985, 67 to 80 percent of the world's
direct foreign investment ended up in the industrial countries. This figure
has drifted upward somewhat over time, with evidence of large fluctuations in
the distribution across countries. Clearly, however, no increase over time
has occurred in the share of direct foreign investment flowing to the
developing countries despite their increasing share of the world labor force.
Table 15 reports another indicator of international capital mobility:
the participation of non-U.S. companies in U.S. stock markets. In June 1992,
6 to 8 percent of the securities/companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange, and the NASDAQ were foreign
based.
Even though foreign participation in United States capital markets is
limited by the Securities and Exchange Commission's accounting practice and
disclosure requirements, these numbers display a significant increase over
time. Of 414 net additions to the NYSE from 1974 to 1992, 79 were foreign
companies. The number of securities listed on the American Stock Exchange
decreased by 20 percent from 1970 to 1992, while the number of foreign
listings increased by 25 percent. This increase in foreign companies'
participation in U.S. stock exchanges took place at a time when the United
States became less dominant as a global financial center as other
international financial centers developed in Tokyo, Frankfurt, and Hong Kong.
These statistics, like the ones on direct foreign investment, reflect a trend
toward greater integration of world capital markets, although in both cases
the level of integration achieved is fairly low. The data for the NYSE also
show that most of the growth in foreign participation (about 90 percent) was
associated with companies from industrial economies.
Other indicators of the integration of world capital markets in the
1980s are available. Between 1982 and 1989 the value of new issues of
international bonds increased from US$76 billion to US$254 billion. The share
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of borrowers from developing countries (excluding offshore financial centers)
in these issues declined from 6 percent in 1982 to 2 percent in 1989.
International trading in equities, that is, transactions in domestic stocks
involving nonresidents (except direct foreign investment), increased from
US$73 billion in 1979 to US$1,213 billion in 1988. Even after correcting for
increases in equity prices, the volume of these transactions more than
quadrupled. The correlation coefficient between stock price indices in the
United States and in other countries increased, on average from 0.35 in 1975-
79 to 0.62 in 1985-88 (Howell and Cozzini 1989; IMF 1990).
Table 16 reports indicators of foreign borrowing by developing countries
in 1970 and 1990. Developing countries' foreign debt increased sharply during
this period, both in absolute terms and relative to their income and the value
of their international trade. The increase was especially high for low-income
countries whose ratio of external debt to GNP increased fivefold. [17] This
increase is an indication of capital mobility to both the public and private
sectors of developing countries as most corporations in these countries have
severely limited access to world capital markets, and have to coordinate their
borrowing with their governments, and in many cases rely on government
guarantees to facilitate foreign borrowing. Foreign borrowing can also
finance direct government investment in developing human capital and physical
infrastructure.
The lower panel of table 16 also demonstrates the increased importance
of foreign borrowing to the developing countries. Actual interest payments
(interest paid in foreign currency, goods, or services) have increased as a
percentage of exports, especially for the low-income developing countries,
even when one accounts for changes in the interest rates paid on debt.
Table 17 sets out some indicators of the international integration of
financial institutions. Between 1975 and 1990, the amounts that banks
borrowed internationally from other banks increased more than twelvefold,
international bank credits to non-banks increased by a factor of more than
thirty between 1970 and 1990, and non-bank deposits in banks located outside
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their country of residence increased dramatically during 1971 to 1990.
The data in table 17 also show that financial integration proceeded
proportionately faster among the industrial economies than among the
developing economies. Industrial countries' share in international interbank
liabilities has increased, and borrowers from these countries almost doubled
their share of international credit to non-banks. Non-bank residents of the
industrial countries more than tripled their share of cross-border deposits of
non-bank institutions. The share of banks located in the industrial countries
in total international deposits by non-banks decreased, however. (This
decrease is fully accounted for by the increasing share of the major offshore
banking centers in the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, and Singapore.)
In sum, international capital mobility increased significantly between
the 1960s and 1990. Although the extent of this development varies from
indicator to indicator, capital mobility is clearly a significant factor in
the integration of the world economy.
International Trade
Perhaps the most dramatic development in the world economic system in
the last forty years is the rapid growth of international trade. Table 18
documents this increase by presenting ratios of exports to GDP for the world
and for different country groups. For the world as a whole, exports increased
from 9 percent of GDP in 1950 to 15 percent in 1988. This increase was
entirely due to the virtual doubling of the export-GDP ratio among the
industrial economies. This ratio fluctuated among the developing countries,
but was almost the same in 1950 and 1990.
The stability of the export-GDP ratio for the developing economies masks
three developments that took place during the period under review: (a) the
large, but transitory, increase in the value of petroleum exports during the
two oil price shocks of the 1970s; (b) the accelerating growth of exports by
the six major exporters of manufactures among the developing countries
Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan; and, (c) the
decrease in the ratio of exports to GDP among the developing countries between
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1950 and 1970, mainly because of the decrease in world demand for primary
goods (as a percentage of aggregate demand), which constituted over 90 percent
of the exports of the developing countries in the 1950s.
Note also that exports are a larger proportion of the GDP in the
developing countries than in the industrial ones. This difference arises
because the developing countries' economies are smaller, and therefore have
had to rely more heavily on trade to satisfy needs that the domestic market
cannot readily satisfy. It also reflects the relative importance of tradeable
goods in the GDP of the developing countries. Thus, the data do not indicate
that the developing economies are closed economies, but rather that their
degree of openness has not increased over time. One natural explanation
for the increase in world trade is the decline in the cost of transporting
goods over time. Table 19 provides evidence of this decline by examining
changes in cost in full (CIF)/free on board (FOB) ratios. [18] CIF reflects
the value of cargo, including insurance and transportation costs. FOB is the
cost of the goods before adding insurance and transportation costs. The
CIF/FOB ratio is thus a measure of transportation and insurance costs as a
share of total costs. Table 19 shows that for the world as a whole this ratio
decreased by 36 percent from 1950 to 1990.
Table 19 also shows that transportation costs among the industrial
countries are relatively low, and are determined largely by the distance
between them and their trading partners. The ratio for Germany, which trades
mostly with other EEC members, is only 1.03, while the ratio for Japan, which
is located relatively far from its trading partners, is 1.09. The decline
over time in the CIF/FOB ratio was sharper for the developed countries, which
dominated the increase in world trade. Table 20 examines the share of
exports from different country groups in world exports. The figures reveal
that the industrial economies have accounted for the dominant share of world
exports during the past four decades, maintaining a roughly 70 percent share
between 1960 and 1989. Among the industrial economies, Japan's share of world
trade increased sevenfold between 1950 and 1989, while the United States'
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share decreased by a quarter.
The developing countries' share of world trade declined in the 1950s, a
consequence of decreasing demand for the primary goods that constituted the
vast majority of their exports (table 21). Since 1960, the share of the
developing countries in world trade has remained fairly stable after one
accounts for changes in oil prices. The figures also reveal a reallocation of
exports among the developing countries. The six major exporters of
manufactures increased their share of world exports from 4 percent in 1960 to
10 percent in 1989, while at the same time the share of all the other
developing countries decreased from 18 percent to 12 percent.
Table 22 examines the trade linkages between developed and developing
countries. During 1958 to 1960, 69 percent of exports by the industrial
countries were destined for other industrial countries. During 1987 to 1989,
this figure rose to 77 percent, suggesting increased economic integration
among the industrial economies relative to the economic integration between
industrial and developing economies.
The lower panel of table 22 displays similar results for the developing
economies. During 1987 to 1989, 30 percent of exports by the developing
countries were imported by other developing countries, up from 24 percent in
1958 to 1960. This increase is associated with a decrease in the share of
exports to industrial economies. Taken together, the two panels indicate that
the degree of economic integration increased faster within each group of
countries than between them. The share of world trade that occurred between
the groups decreased from 42 percent in 1960 to 35 percent in 1989 (calculated
from figures reported in tables 20 and 22, excluding the socialist economies
in Eastern Europe).
The results also indicate that world trade activity did not evolve in a
way that takes full advantage of the large and increasing labor force pool in
the developing countries, suggesting that there are still large potential
gains associated with further integration.
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Summary
The analyses presented in this section support three main conclusions:
(a) there is relatively little international labor mobility and it has not
increased over time (at least through the 1980s); (b) the flow of capital
across international boundaries has increased sharply over time, though the
absolute levels of some measures of international capital mobility are still
relatively low; and (c) trade has increased substantially over time,
especially among the industrial countries, which accounts for the strong
integration of their national economies.
V. Conclusion
As recently as fifty years ago the concepts of a world labor market and
a world economy were little more than hypothetical constructs. International
trade represented a small share of world production, and was limited by
relatively high institutional barriers (including quotas and tariffs), high
transportation costs, and high transaction costs created by a far less
efficient communications system. Capital mobility was limited by some of the
same factors. Physical labor mobility, limited by the psychological and
pecuniary costs associated with migrating across international borders, was
insufficient to integrate the different economies of the world to an
appreciable degree.
The past 50 years have seen the gradual emergence of a world economy.
This emergence was accomplished even though physical labor mobility failed to
increase. In addition, increased labor mobility is unlikely in the future
given the proliferation of legal and financial restrictions on international
migration and policymakers' generally negative attitudes toward international
migration.
A world economy has emerged through increased international trade and
international relocation of jobs, facilitated by capital mobility. For at
least the past twenty-five years, every indicator of the volume of
international capital mobility and international trade has increased, some of
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them dramatically. A world economy has begun to thrive because technological
and institutional changes have decreased significantly the relative costs of
conducting transactions in international goods, capital, and labor services
markets.
National governments generally look favorably upon growth-enhancing
capital infusions into their economies. Governments, especially in developing
economies, have actively tried to attract foreign capital through giving tax
concessions, relaxing various legal requirements, providing guarantees to
private borrowers, and introducing direct subsidies. Many governments,
especially in the industrial economies, have also adopted more favorable
policies toward international trade by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers
to trade and by signing international or regional agreements that facilitate
trade expansion. These include the GATT and the establishment and development
of the EEC, EFTA, and more recently, NAFTA. However, governments have done
very little to encourage international migration, and have generally tightened
migration restrictions during the last forty years for a variety of economic,
social, and political reasons.
To date integration of the world economy has proceeded mainly among the
industrial market economies. Trade and capital mobility have increased faster
among these economies than between industrial and developing economies. This
is especially true if one considers that a small number of developing
economies account for half the international trade of this group of countries
and a large share of capital mobility to and from the developing countries.
Economic integration may have implications for income inequality between
countries. On the one hand, economic integration could decrease income
inequality as factor prices converge as a result of trade and capital
mobility. On the other hand, economic integration could increase inequality
of GNP per capita because of the unequal distribution of capital across
countries. [19]
To illustrate these possibilities, consider the recent opening of
Eastern Europe. This opening may lead to an inflow of capital that will
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increase capital-labor ratios, labor productivity, and wages in Eastern
Europe. One might expect this process to continue until unit labor costs
between Eastern Europe and Western countries are equalized, leading to a
convergence of wages between Eastern Europe and the West. However, this
process also increases the incomes of capital owners in the West as they enjoy
access to a new stock of relatively low-cost labor. Depending on the relative
sizes of these changes, income inequality between the West and Eastern Europe
can increase or decrease as a result of this process.
Table 23 reports Gini coefficients, a standard measure of income
inequality. The coefficients measure inequality of GNP per capita across
countries in 1965 and 1990, with higher values of the coefficient indicating
greater inequality. The analysis only includes countries with income figures
for both 1965 and 1990. Between those years, the coefficient for the world's
twenty-two industrial market economies fell precipitously, losing nearly
two-thirds of its value. By contrast, inequality rose slightly among the
fifty countries that had the lowest levels of per capita GNP in 1990.
Despite the sharp decrease in inequality within the high income group
and the stability of inequality within the low- income group of countries,
world income inequality increased between 1965 and 1990. This increase is a
consequence of the widening gap in average income between the industrialized
countries and the developing countries. Given the rapid integration that
occurred among the industrial economies and the slow pace of integration among
the developing economies, these results are consistent with the view that
economic integration promotes both (a) income growth and (b) the convergence
of material well being across those countries whose economies become
integrated.
Although many of the world's national economies have become more closely
integrated during the last forty years, many others have remained more or less
economically isolated. Labor productivity differentials between more- and
less-developed countries have failed to decrease, and unit labor costs are
still 30 to 60 percent higher in the industrial economies. The persistence of
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these differentials indicates that the integration of economic activity
between the industrial and developing countries has been limited at best. The
existing labor productivity differentials indicate that large benefits could
be realized from further integration. Indeed, per capita GDP has grown much
faster for those developing countries that chose to integrate into the world
economy than for those that did not. As institutional barriers to economic
integration are reduced with the relaxation of trade controls and the removal
of limitations on technology transfers and impediments to capital mobility,
fundamental economic forces will operate undisturbed and will naturally bring
about further integration. Judging by recent historical experience, economic
integration is associated with income growth and reduced inequality between
nations.
However, income inequality within nations may increase as a result of
economic integration. In many developed countries wage differentials between
more- and less-educated (and experienced) workers have increased since the
1970s (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990 and 1991; Blackburn and Bloom 1992;
Katz and Loveman 1992; Davis 1992) and trade may also be expected to increase
the returns to physical capital relative to labor. Unless governments develop
and apply income reallocation mechanisms to compensate those who lose from
integration, consistent political opposition to further integration is likely.
The development of trading blocks as a way to accelerate economic integration
within groups of countries may also require future intrablock compensation to
achieve economic integration between blocks.
Another consequence of increased economic integration is increased
economic dependence between countries. For example, remittances to the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen of Yemeni workers were 15 percent of GDP
in 1989, down from 79 percent in 1980. In 1990 remittances decreased even
further as Yemeni workers were deported from Saudi Arabia and other oil-
exporting countries as a result of their government's support of Iraq during
the Gulf war. This loss of remittances choked off the main source of foreign
exchange to Yemen's economy. In addition, returning migrants flooded the
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Yemen labor market. Egypt also experienced substantial return migration and a
corresponding loss of foreign exchange from remittances when oil prices
dropped in the mid 1980s (see Hansen and Radwan 1982).
These examples demonstrate that the essence of world economic
integration is greater economic dependency, and a consequent magnification of
the risks associated with political and economic change abroad. At the same
time, however, integration reduces the importance of other risks by allowing
for greater risk diversification (Gavin 1992). For example, grain crops in
the former Soviet Union were exposed to risks associated with weather changes
from year to year. Even though the Soviet Union was a relatively closed
economy, it relied upon international trade to reduce the risk of famine in
years of bad weather by trading gold and other primary products for grain, and
by doing so diversified the risk of famine among several suppliers.
International economic integration also increases the degree of
competition in goods and factor markets by increasing the number of
participants in each market. Labor unions provide an excellent example of
this phenomenon. Product markets have grown larger as a result of economic
integration without a corresponding expansion of the scope of union
organization, the predictable result being a loss of union bargaining power
(Hildebrand 1965). Indeed, union membership has decreased steadily in the
United States since the mid-1950's (Blanchflower and Freeman 1992). Until
labor unions find ways to "take wages out of competition by organizing the
relevant product market" (Commons 1913) or lobbying for limitations on trade
or capital mobility, the declining economic strength of labor unions is
unlikely to be reversed.
Growing economic integration necessitates the development of
supranational economic and legal institutions that will secure the rights of
parties involved in international economic activities. Risk premiums
associated with uncertain legal rights when operating in foreign countries are
one of the barriers to achieving efficient capital allocation across
countries. Such organizations as the EEC, IMF, the World Bank, and the G-7
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also try to coordinate international or interregional economic activities and
so reduce the risks associated with companies' international operations.
Over two centuries ago, Adam Smith pointed out the possible production
gains from the division of labor into specialized tasks, and noted that the
size of the market for different goods and services created natural limits on
the division of labor. In other words, full realization of the gains from
specialization requires large markets. The emergence of a world economy as a
result of technological and institutional developments coincides with a growth
in the size of markets, thereby promoting further specialization and
production gains. As more developing countries integrate into the world




1. Different parts of this study use slightly different definitions of
industrial and developing countries depending on the data sources. For exact
definitions see the notes to the tables.
2. Data on labor force participation by women are notoriously poor due to
problems of definition and measurement (see Dixon 1982).
3. The decrease in the LFPR of individuals aged fifteen to twenty-four has a
larger effect on the overall LFPR in the developing countries than in the
industrial economies because the share of this age group in their population
is greater.
4. Because some countries deviate from World Bank standards in their
reporting practices, the reported enrollment-population ratio for primary
school may exceed 1.0. In particular, China reports an enrollment-population
ratio of 1.35, probably because students in the seventh and eighth grades are
categorized as attending primary school. Excluding China, the enrollment-
population ratio in primary schools for the developing countries was 0.73 in
1965 and 0.92 in 1989. For the world, the corresponding rates were 0.80 and
0.93, respectively.
5. Even though enrollment-population ratios increased within both the
industrial and developing countries, it does not necessarily follow that the
overall enrollment-population ratio for the world also increased. Shifts in
the distribution of the world supply of labor away from the industrial
countries could actually have resulted in a decline in the overall enrollment-
population ratio. For example, if industrial countries' share of the world
supply of labor had remained stable after 1965, our calculations indicate that
the world's enrollment-population ratios in 1989 would have all been higher:
108 percent for primary education, 57 percent for secondary education, and 17
percent for tertiary education. (The same qualitative result is obtained when
China is excluded from the calculation.) Thus, the increase in educational
attainment from 1965 to 1989 within country groups was large enough to
dominate the effects of the shifting distribution of the world labor force
away from the high-enrollment industrial economies and toward the low-
enrollment developing economies.
6. This example ignores the reasons for differences in efficiency. The
reason may be accumulation of human capital (e.g., knowledge or craftsmanship)
over time, the existence of different natural resources, or other conditions
(e.g., the weather). Also, as Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933) first
suggested, different factor proportions in different countries can lead to
different economic efficiency in producing different goods.
7. Dixit and Norman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) extend Samuelson's
(1949) work to show that as long as the resources of the different economies
are sufficiently similar, trade will lead to the same world production as
perfect factor mobility. Mundell (1957) comes to the same conclusion. In the
previous example trade cannot substitute for factor mobility because only one
good is produced.
8. In the presence of distortions such as tariffs or subsidies, trade or
factor mobility may decrease the value of production because countries may
specialize in the "wrong" products or labor may move in the "wrong" direction
(see Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).
9. Samuelson (1948), McKenzie (1955), and Chipman (1966) show that as long as
factor proportions are sufficiently similar in the trading countries, within
the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, trade will lead to factor price
equalization.
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10. While these potential gains are based on differences in marginal
productivities, we report average productivities as a proxy because of data
limitations.
11. In the developed countries, the entire increase took place in the service
sector.
12. By using a common deflator for all sectors we allow changes in relative
prices to affect the relative productivity of the sectors.
13. Note that productivity differentials between the developed and developing
countries narrowed mostly in the industrial sector, which includes oil
production, and that most of the narrowing occurred between 1970 and 1980,
when oil prices increased sharply.
14. This statement refers to the developing countries as an aggregate and not
to individual developing countries. Some developing economies performed very
well during this period and their labor productivity grew much closer to that
of the developed economies.
15. The classification of countries as northern or southern is based on the
same criteria as that used to define more and less developed. However, the
north and south categories are subgroups of the countries that are covered in
the more developed and less developed country tables, respectively. For a
complete list of countries see UNIDO (1987).
16. Migration flows in Europe appear to have increased following the
political changes in Central and Eastern Europe, but the period since these
changes occurred has been too short to estimate their long-run effects.
17. The figures for 1990 in Table 16 are net of the substantial debt
write-offs that took place during the 1980s.
18. The CIF/FOB ratio is an indication of transportation and insurance costs.
It is not standardized for changes in distance between trading partners or for
the nature of the goods being transported.
19. In terms of GDP per capita, incomes will converge as a result of capital




Blackburn, M. and D. Bloom. 1992. "The Distribution of Total Family Income:
Measuring and Explaining Changes in the 1980's in Canada and the U.S." in D.
Card, ed. Labor Markets in Canada and the United States. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. (forthcoming).
. 1991. "Changes in the Structure of Family Income Inequality in
the United States and Other Industrialized Nations During the 1980's."
(unpublished).
Blackburn, M., D. Bloom, and R. Freeman. 1990. "The Declining Economic
Position of Less Skilled American Men." G. Burtless, ed. A Future of Lousy
Jobs? The Brookings Institution. 31-67.
. 1990. "An Era of Falling Earnings and Rising Inequality?"
Brookings Review. Winter 1990/91. 38-43.
Bloom, D. and R. Freeman. 1986. "The Effects of Rapid Population Growth on
Labor Supply and Employment in Developing Countries." Population and
Development Review. September 1986. 381-414.
. 1988. "Economic Development and the Timing and Components of
Population Growth." Journal of Policy Modeling. April 1988. 57-82.
Brender, A. 1988. "Labor Cost and Competitiveness in Israeli Industry." The
Israeli Tax Review 16:323-337 (in Hebrew).
Chipman, J. 1966. "A Survey of the Theory of International Trade, Part 3."
Econometric a. 34: 18-76.
Commons, John R. 1913. Labor and Administration. New York: Macmillan.
Davis, S.J. 1992. "Cross-Country Patterns of Change in Relative Wages."
NBER Working Paper No. 4085. Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Dixit, A. and V. Norman. 1980. Theory of International Trade. Cambridge,
U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Dixon, R. 1982. "Women in Agriculture: Counting the Labor Force in
Developing Countries." Population and Development Review. 8: 539-566.
Findlay, R. 1991. "Wage Dispersion, International Trade and the Services
Sector." Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper #556.
Gavin, M. 1991. "Equity Markets in the World Economy: Capital Flows, Asset
Prices and the Transfer Problem." (unpublished paper, Columbia University).
Hamermesh, D. and M. Gunderson. 1991. "The Effects of Free Trade on the
North American Labor Market." in C. Reynolds, ed. Dynamics of North American
Trade and Investment. Stanford University Press.
Hansen, B. and S. Radwan. 1982. Employment Opportunities and Equity in a
Changing Economy: Egypt in the 1980's. Geneva: International Labour Office.
Heckscher, E. 1919. "The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of
Income." Ekono Tidskriff, pp. 497-512. Reprinted in American Economic
Association. 1949. Readings in the theory of International Trade, chapter
13. Philadelphia: Blakiston.
32
Helpman, E. and P. Krugman. 1985. Market Structure and Foreign Trade.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Hildebrand, G. 1974. "Problems and Policies Affecting Labor's Interests."
American Economic Review. May 1974. 283-288.
Horn, R. and A. Arriagada. 1986. The Educational Attainment of the World
Population. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Howell, M., and A. Cozzini. 1989. International Equity Flows-1989 Edition:
Are International Equities Ex-Growth? London: Salomon Brothers.
International Labour Organisation. 1986. Economically Active Population
1950-2025. Geneva.
International Monetary Fund. 1984, 1988, 1991, various issues. International
Financial Statistics.
IMF(International Monetary Fund) 1990. International Capital Markets:
Development and Prospects. Washington, D.C.
Katz, L. and G. Loveman. 1990. "An International Comparison of Changes in
the Structure of Wages: France, The United Kingdom, and the United States."
Harvard University.
Lipsey, R.G. and K. Lancaster. 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best."
Review of Economic Studies. 24 (1): 11-32.
Marshall, A. 1936. Principles of Economics. London: Macmillan.
McKenzie, L. 1955. "Equality of Factor Prices in World Trade."
Econometrica. 23: 239-57.
Mundell, R. A. 1957. "International Trade and Factor Mobility." American
Economic Review. 47: 321-25.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 1988. SOPEMI
1987. Paris.
Ohlin, B. 1966. Interregional and International Trade. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Samuelson, P. 1948. "International Trade and the Equalization of Factor
Prices." Economic Journal. 58: 163-84.
. 1949. "International Factor-Price Equalization Once Again."
Economic Journal. 59: 181-97.
Sraffa, P., ed. 1951. The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
UN (United Nations). 1978, 1986. Demographic Yearbook, 1985 and 1977. New
York.
1979. Trends and Characteristics Of International Migration
Since 1950. New York.
. 1983. Handbook of International Trade. New York.




1990. Conference on International Trade and Development. New
Center on Transnational Corporations. 1983a and 1988,
Transnational Corporations In World Development. New York.
. 1983b. Salient Features and Trends In Foreign Direct Investment
UNIDO (United Nations Industry and Development Organization).
New York.
1987. Global Report 1986. New York.
Widgren, J. 1987. "International Migration: New Challenges in Europe."
Migration News (2). Geneva: International Catholic Migration Commission.
World Bank. 1988, 1992, various issues. World Development Report. New York:
Oxford University Press.
34
































































Notes: The potential labor force is defined as all those aged fifteen to
sixty-four. The actual labor force consists of all employed and
unemployed persons (including those seeking work for the first time).
It covers employees, self-employed persons, salaried employees, wage
earners, unpaid family workers, members of producer cooperatives, and
members of the armed forces. The developing countries are considered
to be all countries except the more developed countries (MDC), i.e.,
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the
European countries.
Source: ILO (1986).
TABLE 2. AGE AND GENDER OF THE WORLD LABOR FORCE, SELECTED YEARS
Category
Percentage of women




























































Notei For definitions, see table 1.
a. Estimated
b. Projected
c. Average ages are calculated as weighted averages of average ages across
countries, with labor force figures used to construct the weights. Average
ages within countries are calculated by averaging across five-year age
groups. For each five-year age group the arithmetic average of the endpoints
of the age interval is used as the average age.
Source: ILO (1986).








































































































Note: The labor force participation rate is defined as the ratio of the actual
labor force to the potential labor force. For other definitions, see
table 1.
Source: ILO (1986).
TABLE 4. AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING BY AGE GROUP, 1980
Age Group
Country Group 25-29 45-49
World 7.1 5.2
MDC 11.5 9.5
Developing Countries 5 .5 3.1
Note: The figures reported here are population weighted averages of each
country's years of schooling. The average is across the countries
that are included in Horn and Arriagada (1986). The population in
each age group is used to construct the weights of the different
countries. For definitions see table 1.
Sources: Horn and Arriagada (1986); ILO (1986).



































Note: The entries in this table are calculated by (a) dividing the student
enrollment in each education level by the population in the relevant
age group, (b) calculating a weighted average of these figures using
population in the relevant age groups to construct the weights, and







The reported figures may exceed 100 if sizeable numbers of students
are drawn from outside the relevant age group.
Sources: ILO (1986); World Bank (1992).
























































Note: Totals may not add exactly to 100 because of rounding. The statistics
do not include the Eastern European economies except for Hungary and
Yugoslavia. For definitions of MDCs and developing countries see
table 1.
Source: ILO (1986).
TABLE 7. PRODUCTIVITY OF THE WORLD LABOR FORCE BY SECTOR, SELECTED YEARS
(GDP per economically active person in 1980 U.S. dollars)a











1960 312 2,451 2,329 815
1970 318 2,709 2,331 953
1980 487 5,366 4,172 1,904
Note: The data do not include East European economies (except for Hungary
and Yugoslavia) or the socialist economies in Asia (except for China)
For definitions of MDCs and developing countries see table 1.
a. Using the U.S. GNP deflator.

























TABLE 8. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' SHARE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY, SELECTED YEARS
(PERCENT)


























Note: The data do not include East European economies (except for Hungary
and Yugoslavia) or the socialist economies in Asia (except for China)
For definitions of MDCs and developing countries see table 1.
Sources: ILO (1986); IMF (1984, sup. [8]).
















































































































Glass and its products










Note: The productivity ratio is calculated as the ratio of value added per
employee in the north to value added per employee in the south. For a
list of sampled north and south countries see the source.
a. The figures for value added per employee in 1963 were calculated by dividing
value added per employee in 1980 by the productivity growth for the period
1963-79.
Source; UNIDO (1987
TABLE 10. IMMIGRATION-POPULATION RATIOS, SELECTED COUNTRIES,
1950-84
Country 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-84a


















Notez Immigration-population ratios were calculated by dividing the total
number of immigrants during the period by average population. Average
population for the decade was calculated as the arithmetic average of
the population at the end points of the period.
a. The ratio is adjusted for a ten-year period by multiplying the number of
immigrants by two.
b. The data are adjusted to account for unreported years during the period
based on closest year available.
c. Includes immigration from Algeria.






























































TABLE 11. GOVERNMENT PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL EMIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION
(AS OF 1987)
1. Emigration
















































Note: Definition of areas is according to UN regional commissions. The
definitions of significant or insignificant emigration and immigration
reflect the subjective perceptions of the government officials who
responded to the questionnaires.
Source: U.N. (1988).





























































Note: Definition of areas is according to UN regional commissions. All
answers reflect the perceptions of the government officials who
answered the questionnaire.
Source: UN (1988).
TABLE 13. DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY SOURCE, SELECTED
YEARS






economies 99.8 98.0 96.6 94.9 89.0
Other industrial
economies - 1.5 2.2 3.3 9.0





formation ^ 9 2_12 2^5 2^5 2.8
Note: The major industrial economies are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Sweden, United States, and United Kingdom. The other industrial
economies are Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. The
data do not include socialist economies of Eastern Europe and East
Asia except Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China.
a. Based on the average for 1967-69.
Sources: IMF (1984; sup. [8], 1988); UN Center on Transnational Corporations
(1983a and 1988, 1983b).
TABLE 14. DISTRIBUTION OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY TARGET, SELECTED
YEARS (PERCENTAGE OF WORLD TOTAL)
Target 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Major industrial




a. Includes other industrial economies.

















TABLE 15. INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS,
1970S AND 1992
Category 1970s 1992
New York Stock Exchange
Number of companies listed













Number of securities listed




Number of securities listed













TABLE 16. INDICATORS OF FOREIGN BORROWING BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
1970 AND 1990
Category 1970 1990a




















Interest payments as a percentage
of exports of goods and services
All developing economies
Low income
















a. The figures for 1990 are net of the substantial debt write-offs that took
place during the 1980s.
b. Estimated.
Source: World Bank (various issues).





All countries (US $ billions)
Percentage of borrowing banks in
industrial countries









Cross-border bank credit to non-
banks
All countries (US $ billions)
Percentage of lending to
borrowers in industrial countries








Cross-border bank deposits of
non-banks&
1971 1990
All countries (US $ billions)
Percentage in banks located in
industrial countries








Note: The data cover only IMF members.
a. As reported by residence of borrowing banks.
b. The data for the industrial countries do not include the Cayman Islands and
the Bahamas.
c. 1974.
Source: IMF (various issues).
TABLE 18. EXPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, SELECTED YEARS
Country group 1950 1960 1970 1980 1988

































Major petroleum - 20.9 20.4 39.1 16.7
exporters
Major manufactures - 13.3 14.0 21.6 32.8
exporters
Socialist 2.7 3.3 1.8 6.7 13.6
economies in Asia
Note: For definitions of country categories see source,
a. Excluding the socialist economies of Eastern Europe
Sources; UN (1983, 1990).
TABLE 19. CHANGE IN TRANSPORTATION COSTS BY COUNTRY GROUP,
SELECTED YEARS (RATIO OF IMPORTS CIF TO IMPORTS FOB)






























































Note: For definitions of country categories see source,
a. 1989.
Source: IMF (1991).




















































6.8 10.1 9.8 7.8 6.8ies in
„ . , . , . 1.3 1.6 0.8 1.0 1.8
Socialist
economies in Asia
Note: For definitions of country categories see source.



















TABLE 21. COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF WORLD TRADE
Commodity Group 1955 1970 1988



















Source: UNIDO: Conference on International Trade and Development, New



























































Note: The data do not include the socialist economies in Eastern Europe,
a. Including socialist economies in Asia.
Source: UNIDO (1976, 1990).
TABLE 23. WORLD INCOME INEQUALITY, 1965 AND 1990
Country group 1965 1990
World 0.69 0.75
22 industrial market economies 0.28 0.10
50 lowest-income countries (as of 1990)a 0.32 0.33
Note: The entries in the table are Gini coefficients for the
countries in the category. Gini coefficients can have
values between zero and one. An increase in the
coefficient represents increased income inequality. The
countries' incomes are ranked according to GNP per capita
as reported in the source. The 22 industrial market
economies are Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Israel,
Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, and
all the EEC members in 1988 except Luxembourg.
a. Excludes China and India.
Source: World Bank (1992).
